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Lopez and Campbell (2004) find a statistically significant, positive re­
lationship between incumbents' deviations from their constituents' pre­
ferences and incumbents subsequent campaign expenditures. We 
replicate their empirical program using a different measure of incum­
bent deviation based on Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998). 
Using both measures of incumbents' deviations we both confirm and 
disconfirm the Lopez and Campbell result, implying either the construct 
of incumbents' deviations from constituents' interests or its operationa­
lization is underdeveloped. 
INTRODUCTION 
L opez and Campbell (2004) examine the empirical rela­tionship between vote score residuals and incumbents' campaign expenditures in the subsequent re-election bid. 
The incumbent's goal is to get re-elected. The literature on legis­
lator voting has consistently shown that deviating from constitu­
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ents' preferred policies makes this objective more difficult 
(~ender and_ Lott, 1996). Despite this, an incumbent may occa­
siOnally deviate from constituents' preferences with good reason 
(to pursue personal views, to service interest group pressure, to 
d~~on~trate loyalty to party leaders, etc.). To deviate while di­
rrumsh_mg the costs of deviating, incumbents may increase their 
campaign expenditures in an effort to convince constituents to 
~ote for them regardless of their policy positions. This interpreta­
tion of re-election expenditures has been termed "persuasive" 
campaigning (Mueller and Stratmarm, 1994). If we view con­
gressiOnal seat~ as _an economic good and re-election expendi­
~ures as the urut pnce pmd by an incumbent for the good, then 
I~cumbents may "buy" some deviation, in the form of dimi­
rush~d el~ctoral punishment, by expending more in their re­
e~ectwn bids: ~opez ~d.Campbell (2004) find a statistically sig­
mfi~ant positive empmcal relationship between incumbents' 
deviatiOns and their subsequent campaign expenditures for the 
1992 throu?h 1998 Congressional elections, indicating persua­
sive campaign expenditures. 
However, to derive their measure of incumbent deviation 
Lopez and Campbell rely on the widely used but still controver~ 
sial "residualization" procedure pioneered by Kau and Rubin 
(1979). This paper seeks to replicate the empirical program of 
~opez an~ Campbel~ witho~t recourse to the controversial empir­
Ical tec!Ullq~e by usmg a different literature to derive a different 
measure of mcumbent deviation. Berry, Ringquist, _Fording, and 
Hanson (1998) present a framework for producing an alternative 
me_asure on congresspersons' ideology based on interest group 
ratm?s of congress~ersons (like the Kau and Rubin measure) and 
electiOn results. Usmg ~method similar to that of Berry, et al., 
we produce an alternative measure of incumbents' deviations 
from electorate wishes. 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
PAYING TO DEVIATE FROM CONSTITUENT INTERESTS 
Using our new measure of incumbents' deviation from con­
stituents' interests, we replicate the Lopez and Campbell empiri­
cal procedure. Contrary to the findings of Campbell and Lopez 
(2004), we find that our measure of incumbent deviations is not 
significantly related to incumbents' re-election expenditures. 
However, we find that more incumbent deviation significantly 
predicts lower vote margins for the incumbent and lower oppo­
nent's expenditures in the incumbent's subsequent re-election 
bid. Taken together, these findings imply that incumbent devia­
tion does matter, as implied by Bender and Lott (1996). Further­
more, the incumbent is not able to "buy back" some of his 
deviation in a subsequent election bid. Rather, the electorate re­
wards the challenger with higher voter support regardless of in­
cumbent expenditure. 
However, closer inspection of our results is not as injurious 
to Lopez and Campbell (2004) as first inspection might indicate. 
Despite the proposition that Lopez and Campbell's deviation 
variable and our current deviation variable measure the same 
phenomena, and despite the shared derivation of both meas­
ures-adjusted ADA scores for incumbents-the two variables 
have a low correlation coefficient of 0.049. Furthermore, models 
applying both deviation variables both reconfirms the main Lo­
pez and Campbell (2004) result and reconfirms this study's re­
sult. These findings imply to us that either the construct of 
incumbent deviations from constituent's purported interests, or 
the operationalization of the construct, is underdeveloped. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 
two considers background theoretical issues, section three 
presents the empirical results, while section four discusses and 
concludes. 
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